Commentary: The Real Recipe for Bad School Food — A Flawed Bidding System

The article examines the ongoing controversy over the poor quality of school lunches in Shanghai, highlighting the paradox of such issues in a city renowned for its dynamic dining scene. The author argues that this problem is rooted less in suppliers’ ethics or regulatory failures, and more fundamentally in flawed economic and administrative mechanisms that govern the system of providing school meals [para. 1][para. 2][para. 3][para. 4]. The school meal procurement process in Shanghai relies on a government-led, monopolistic bidding system, where single suppliers are awarded exclusive contracts to service specific schools for up to three years. This process lacks transparency, excludes student and parent input, and employs exit mechanisms that are unreliable, such as satisfaction surveys that are easily manipulated and rarely lead to meaningful change or supplier replacement [para. 5][para. 6][para. 7][para. 8][para. 9][para. 10][para. 11].

The article details how these satisfaction surveys are poorly implemented; their design, execution, and outcomes are opaque, and some parents report that students are pressured to provide positive feedback, rendering the process toothless and unrepresentative [para. 8][para. 9]. Due to this lack of real-time, genuine feedback and the periodic, formalistic use of surveys, suppliers face little risk of termination or competition, which undermines any incentive for quality improvement [para. 12][para. 13]. Attempts at reforms, such as the introduction of an "A/B menu" system in 2024, gave students two meal choices per day but failed to bring substantial improvement because the monopoly remained unchallenged [para. 15][para. 16].

The article argues that economics shows monopolies eliminate competitive pressure, which is vital for motivating suppliers to maintain and improve meal standards. The current system’s stated goal is food safety, but its structure is ill-suited to achieving this because companies are not meaningfully challenged to excel [para. 17][para. 18][para. 19]. The author advocates for market-based solutions: publicizing standards for food safety, creating uniform qualification benchmarks, and establishing a market platform where multiple prequalified suppliers can offer meals, allowing students or parents to choose among them [para. 20][para. 21][para. 22]. Real competition would provide immediate feedback, reward quality, and penalize underperformance, similar to what is observed in Shanghai’s competitive restaurant sector and in university cafeterias, which tend to have higher customer satisfaction due to internal competition [para. 23][para. 24][para. 25].

Critics of this proposal cite concerns over administrative complexity and the unpredictability of orders. However, the author counters that with today’s developed logistics and e-commerce capabilities, managing meal distribution for schools should be logistically straightforward and economically viable, even with multiple suppliers. Coordination costs can be further offset through minor surcharges and logistical innovations [para. 26][para. 27][para. 28][para. 29]. The author contends that government regulation should shift from focusing on identifying individual suppliers to building transparent and competitive processes supported by traceable platforms and effective oversight, such as publishing meal details and establishing stakeholder supervisory committees [para. 30][para. 31][para. 32][para. 33][para. 34][para. 35].

The article concludes that only open, transparent market competition is capable of sustainably improving the quality and price of school lunches [para. 36][para. 37][para. 38][para. 39]. The persistent reliance on flawed monopoly bidding not only stifles service quality but may foster corruption, as suggested by recent scandals involving major suppliers like Lujie Industrial Development [para. 40][para. 41]. Through leveraging China’s advanced catering and e-commerce ecosystem, and embracing innovation in process regulation, the city can ensure safe, affordable, and satisfactory school meals for all students [para. 42][para. 43]. The solution, the author asserts, is to let the market play the decisive role in resource allocation—ultimately achieving the goal of high-quality school lunches [para. 44][para. 45].