Commentary: Trump’s Tariff Strategy Sows Doubt in Washington
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Donald Trump’s tariff threats resurfaced in October, but this time Beijing has met them with composure. From a U.S. perspective, it is useful to objectively review how American political circles assess the president’s tariff strategy. This provides a framework for understanding the potential future direction of American trade policy.
The latest escalation in tariff tensions stems from non-tariff measures the U.S. adopted against China in September. On Sept. 30, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security, or BIS, announced its “50% rule,” which expanded export controls from entities on the Entity List and Military End-User List to any affiliated company in which these entities hold a direct or indirect stake of 50% or more. On Oct. 9, China’s Ministry of Commerce responded with its own export controls on rare-earth elements. The next day, Donald Trump reacted fiercely on social media, threatening to impose 100% tariffs, implement export controls on key software, and cancel his planned meeting with the Chinese head of state at the APEC summit in South Korea. By Oct. 11, however, Trump had changed his tune, stating that the meeting had not been formally canceled.

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- Trump’s renewed tariff threats in October 2025 led to tense U.S.-China trade exchanges, with China responding more proactively and targeting rare earth exports.
- U.S. think tanks and policymakers criticize widespread tariffs as economically harmful, instead urging targeted export controls and positive incentives for strategic industries.
- Washington politicians oppose using security and technology issues as bargaining chips, and a broad “grand bargain” with China is seen as unlikely; businesses prioritize tariff reduction.
The article examines renewed trade tensions between the U.S. and China, especially as they relate to Donald Trump’s approach since his return to the U.S. presidency following the 2024 election, and the evolving strategies and concerns from both sides. It provides a chronological and analytical view of recent events, policy shifts, and expert opinions on the effectiveness and implications of tariff-centric trade policy. [para. 1]
In October, Trump revived his aggressive tariff threats. While his rhetoric remains intense, Beijing’s response has been notably measured compared to previous years. The new escalation was triggered by both U.S. non-tariff measures—specifically tightened export controls by the Commerce Department’s BIS—and China’s retaliatory export controls on rare-earth elements. Trump, initially threatening harsher tariffs and canceling a key summit with Chinese leadership, quickly softened his position, exemplifying his tactical, negotiation-based style. [para. 2]
Analysts in U.S. political circles observe that China has adapted its tariff strategy in two key ways in 2024. First, China exchanges tactical, easily reversible concessions (such as deals on TikTok and agricultural purchases) to secure strategic benefits, minimizing real compromises to their core interests. Second, China is now more proactive, e.g., suspending U.S. soybean purchases and leveraging rare-earth controls as negotiation tools. These steps reflect a more assertive posture than during the initial trade war. [para. 3][para. 4]
China’s recent export-controls have moved from domestic exporter management to include extraterritorial application, marking a significant escalation. This shift has raised bipartisan alarm in the U.S., with policymakers urging action to reinforce American supply chains in response to China’s new tactics. [para. 5]
Trump’s negotiating style focuses on deploying harsh rhetoric as a means of gaining leverage, as seen in previous summits. Historically, he has used public threats ahead of meetings to pressure counterparts, followed by partial concessions post-meeting—an approach now met by a more calculating Chinese response. [para. 6]
Major U.S. think tanks (Cato, AEI, PIIE) sharply criticize the reciprocal tariff model for causing market distortions and delaying business investment. Studies show that tariffs incentivize companies to delay imports, rely on loopholes, and hope for policy reversals. High tariffs are viewed as unsustainable and damaging to U.S. supply chains. Experts recommend distinguishing between goods types and caution against using tariffs as mere negotiation chips, as they bring domestic economic harm with limited strategic gain. [para. 7]
Current U.S. strategic thinking increasingly favors narrow, targeted export controls over broad tariffs, expansion of positive incentives (like trade preferences and R&D support), and enhanced anti-circumvention enforcement. This is seen as a more effective, sustainable, and less self-damaging path forward, emphasizing precision tools (Sections 301/232) instead of universal tariffs. [para. 8]
A core divide persists between Trump, who values quick, tangible economic wins to demonstrate negotiating prowess, and the Washington establishment, which focuses on long-term security and strategic interests, resisting transactional exchanges (especially technology or security concessions) merely for temporary gains. This has led to bipartisan pushback against Trump’s attempts to trade investment or security relaxations for agricultural purchases or tariff cuts. [para. 9][para. 10]
The ongoing lack of a major deal is viewed as disadvantageous for the U.S., creating pressure on the Trump administration as U.S. agricultural exports and investment activity sag. Nevertheless, smaller, more enforceable agreements are seen as more probable and appropriate given current dynamics, with a “grand bargain” considered both unlikely and undesirable by experts like those at CSIS. [para. 11][para. 12]
The article concludes by noting that while differing perspectives persist, the consensus in expert and official circles leans toward more focused, sustainable, and strategically grounded trade tools rather than the confrontational, one-off transactional tactics of high tariffs and headline-driven negotiations. [para. 13][para. 14]
- Shenwan Hongyuan Securities
- Zhao Wei, the chief economist at Shenwan Hongyuan Securities, is mentioned in the article. No further information about Shenwan Hongyuan Securities is provided.
- April 2017:
- The Mar-a-Lago summit between U.S. and China took place.
- 2018:
- Trump and Chinese leadership held a G-20 meeting.
- Nov. 26, 2018:
- Donald Trump stated before the Dec. 1, 2018 G-20 summit that it was 'highly unlikely' he would hold off on raising tariffs on $200 billion of goods and threatened tariffs on another $267 billion.
- Dec. 1, 2018:
- G-20 summit in Buenos Aires; after the summit, China lowered tariffs on U.S. automobiles and increased agricultural purchases, and the U.S. suspended its tariff hike.
- 2019:
- Trump and Chinese leadership held another G-20 meeting.
- 2020:
- Phase One agreement between U.S. and China was reached.
- March 2025:
- American Compass published an article advising differentiation between intermediate goods and critical components regarding tariffs.
- April 2025:
- China first introduced export-control measures targeting domestic exporters.
- April 2025:
- Trump demanded TSMC build a factory in the U.S. or face potential 100% tariffs.
- April 2025:
- AEI article noted U.S. government estimated tariff rates were several times higher than normal.
- January to August 2025:
- U.S. soybean exports to China totaled 218 million bushels, much lower than 2024; Brazilian data set a record high.
- May 13, 2025:
- Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer criticized Trump for lowering tariffs for almost nothing in return.
- June to August 2025:
- U.S. soybean shipments to China were almost zero.
- July 2025:
- House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory Meeks and Select Committee on China ranking member Krishnamoorthi sent a joint letter on export controls.
- July 30, 2025:
- Several senators co-signed a letter warning against suspending restrictions on key technology exports.
- August 2025:
- Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond study noted businesses in a volatile tariff environment delay orders.
- August 2025:
- PIIE released study on the political and economic cost of reciprocal tariffs.
- September 2025:
- CSIS article advised targeted use of existing Section 301 and 232 tariffs.
- Sept. 30, 2025:
- U.S. Commerce Department’s BIS announced the '50% rule,' expanding export controls.
- October 2025:
- Trump's tariff threats resurfaced; Chinese response was composed.
- October 2025:
- China's Ministry of Commerce applied new export-control measures, including extraterritorial application for the first time.
- October 2025:
- Resource for the Future (RFF) highlighted rare-earth controls’ role as bargaining chips in negotiations.
- October 2025:
- House Select Committee on China called for U.S. supply chain fortification.
- Oct. 4, 2025:
- Moolenaar addressed media reports of a proposed exchange between large-scale U.S. investments and eased security restrictions and tariffs.
- Oct. 6, 2025:
- CSIS publicly argued that a 'grand bargain' is not in the U.S. interest.
- Oct. 9, 2025:
- China’s Ministry of Commerce announced export controls on rare-earth elements.
- Oct. 9, 2025:
- CSIS article argued the new China export controls signaled a qualitative shift in strategy.
- Oct. 10, 2025:
- Trump threatened 100% tariffs, key software export controls, and canceling his APEC summit meeting with China.
- By Oct. 11, 2025:
- Trump stated that the APEC summit meeting had not been formally canceled.
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