Commentary: East China Provinces Team Up to Curb Profit-Driven Policing of Businesses

In a significant move to address predatory law enforcement, regulators in China’s Yangtze River Delta—which includes Zhejiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Anhui—have issued a unified set of rules known as the “Eight Measures.” These regulations aim to combat abusive cross-jurisdictional enforcement and profit-driven investigations, often referred to as “deep-sea fishing.” This is the first time there has been a coordinated regional effort in China to curb such rogue practices, reflecting a strong stance against expedient or financially motivated investigations that have plagued the business environment in recent years. [para. 1]

The Chinese central government has long prioritized eliminating these practices, with measures such as the draft Private Economy Promotion Law explicitly banning officials from using cross-jurisdictional enforcement for profit. In the past year, actions by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate have sought to standardize corporate legal cases, including direct supervision over cases of improper long-arm enforcement. Additionally, new Ministry of Public Security regulations now govern how cross-provincial corporate criminal cases are handled. These national efforts have, thus far, significantly reduced the prevalence of predatory enforcement. [para. 2]

Market regulators in the Yangtze River Delta, often not the main perpetrators in high-profile fishing cases, are taking the initiative with these deeper institutional reforms. This regional cooperation is particularly relevant in such a highly economically integrated area and serves as a valuable experiment in legal harmonization. Their proactive measures provide important lessons to other regions and departments. [para. 3]

The new rules bring procedural transparency by clarifying what constitutes cross-jurisdictional enforcement and emphasizing minimal disruption to regular business operations. Enforcement agencies conducting investigations outside their jurisdiction must coordinate with local counterparts, notify relevant authorities, and ensure local representation during on-site evidence collection. To avoid overlapping investigations, evidence collected in one participating region should be recognized by the others. The measures also set out standards for penalties, processes to resolve jurisdictional conflicts, and call for restraint in using coercive measures, ultimately aiming to address the roots of predatory enforcement. [para. 4]

By embedding these constraints into the administrative framework, the initiative reflects both the sophisticated governance and the economic vitality of the Yangtze Delta. Such actions are essential for regions that rely on a healthy business environment and competitiveness, underscoring the importance of transparent and fair law enforcement as a foundation for sustainable economic success. [para. 5]

Profit-driven law enforcement is often disguised as legitimate regulation but generally arises from financial pressures, unclear jurisdictions, and the misapplication of law for the gain of specific departments or officials. This can destabilize economic order and erode the confidence of entrepreneurs. The only lasting remedy is a robust, rule-based system with strict procedural controls that prevents authorities from prioritizing revenue collection over justice and economic stability. [para. 6]

Expanding this cooperative enforcement model across China remains a challenge due to uneven governance standards. Broader horizontal (across departments) and vertical (down the bureaucratic hierarchy) coordination are needed to fully restrain arbitrary enforcement. The success of the Delta’s approach will serve as a touchstone for deeper institutional reform, but the battle against “deep-sea fishing” is not over. [para. 7]

Although a recent crackdown has subdued discussion of predatory enforcement, the issue persists beneath the surface, highlighting the need for ongoing vigilance and systemic change to address deeper institutional flaws in China’s regulatory environment. [para. 8]