Commentary: To Avert Superpower Dependence, Europe Chooses Geoeconomics

1. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer recently completed a four-day trip to China, underscoring a renewed diplomatic engagement not seen from a UK leader in eight years. During his visit, Starmer engaged in cultural activities in Shanghai, showcasing soft diplomacy by purchasing local goods and highlighting shared cultural symbols. These gestures aimed to lay the groundwork for positive bilateral relations between the UK and China and to signal openness to collaboration [para. 1].

2. This visit marks a significant shift from the previous “stop-start” cycle of UK-China engagement, according to Business and Trade Secretary Peter Kyle. The relationship is evolving into a more stable, “long-term strategic” partnership rather than trying to revive the “Golden Era” of earlier decades, a sentiment echoed by both British and Chinese officials [para. 2].

3. The renewed diplomatic thaw extends well beyond the UK, with a surge of European leaders making high-level visits to China within a short timeframe. Notable recent visits include Spain’s King Felipe VI (his first trip in 18 years), the Norwegian and Finnish foreign ministers, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Irish Taoiseach Micheál Martin, the latter marking the first such Irish visit in 14 years. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is expected to follow. Many of these visits are interpreted as a rush to strengthen ties before a planned visit by US President Donald Trump in April 2026 [para. 3][para. 4][para. 5].

4. European leaders have amplified their outreach by engaging Chinese citizens via social media, cultural references, and local traditions. For example, Starmer’s team dined with locals using chopsticks, while French President Macron quoted Chinese poetry and visited native pandas. These symbolic interactions are calculated to build goodwill and mutual understanding [para. 6].

5. The broader context points to a calculated realignment among “middle powers” who feel compelled to mediate their interests amid changing global dynamics. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, at the World Economic Forum, advocated for middle powers to act collectively to avoid marginalization. Canada’s recent outreach to China, after a years-long hiatus, exemplifies this trend of urgency among Western nations [para. 7][para. 8][para. 9].

6. The primary driver for this renewed engagement between Europe and China is economic. Major trade and investment deals were announced, such as the UK securing £5 billion ($6.85 billion) in commercial agreements and AstraZeneca’s $15 billion planned investment in China. Macron’s delegation inked ten deals worth billions, Finland signed agreements in multiple sectors, and Canada negotiated tariff reductions on its exports in exchange for lower tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles [para. 10][para. 11].

7. These economic ties reflect four critical areas of complementarity: (1) Trade—in 2025, China accounted for 45 out of 64 “critically important” industrial materials for Europe; (2) Energy—China’s low-cost renewable technologies are key to Europe’s green transition, with the UK already investing in 6 gigawatts of Chinese wind power capacity; (3) Critical minerals—Europe relies on China for 98% of its rare earth supply; and (4) Finance—the UK is looking to deepen financial ties through projects like the Shanghai-London Stock Connect and more yuan-denominated green bonds [para. 13][para. 14][para. 15][para. 16].

8. The shift is also driven by Europe’s economic challenges: stagnation since the 2008 crisis, minimal growth in Germany, high public debt, and innovation-stifling overregulation. To revitalize itself, Europe is pivoting from ideological alliances toward pragmatic geoeconomic strategies, seeking mutual benefit and decreased friction compared with uncertain trans-Atlantic relations [para. 17][para. 18][para. 19].

9. Europe is actively diversifying its global dependencies to avoid overreliance on any one superpower, as demonstrated by its recent free trade agreement with India. Additionally, European capital has begun reallocating away from US markets; for instance, Sweden’s Alecta sold up to $8.8 billion in US Treasuries, a hedge against policy shifts anticipated under a Trump presidency [para. 20][para. 21].

10. The evolving global order is marked by interconnectedness, low trust, and calculated maneuvering. China’s aim is not to form formal alliances but to achieve an indispensable status in the global economy, a position Europe appears to accept as the new reality [para. 22].