Commentary: The Quiet Rise of an Asian Economic Security Alliance

1. The article discusses the formation of an Asia-Pacific economic security net centered on Australia, as attention turns to Donald Trump’s first trip to China in his second term (elected in November 2024, inaugurated January 2025) [para. 1]. The immediate catalyst is the energy crisis from the war in Iran, which has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, a critical shipping lane [para. 2][para. 4].

2. Australia, despite being a major exporter of iron ore, coal, and LNG, is heavily dependent on imports of crude oil and refined petroleum products [para. 3]. Its daily operations rely on refined products from China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia [para. 5]. Consequently, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Trade Minister Don Farrell made back-to-back visits to Beijing in late April 2025, aiming to secure reliable energy supplies [para. 2][para. 6]. Data shows China exported 1.53 million tons of aviation fuel to Australia in 2025, accounting for one-third of its jet fuel imports [para. 7].

3. Before their Beijing visits, both Wong and Farrell stopped in Japan, a key Australian ally and an exporter of refined oil products despite being resource-poor [para. 8][para. 9]. These visits highlight a broader geopolitical calculus: Australia is a “periodic table” nation possessing almost all critical mineral resources, as noted by former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd [para. 10][para. 11]. Since the start of 2025, leaders from Canada (Mark Carney) and Japan (Sanae Takaichi) have made successive visits to Australia, underscoring its role as a vital pillar of an emerging economic security net [para. 12][para. 13].

4. The formation of this net is also driven by Trump’s tariff war, which triggered Chinese export controls on rare earths and permanent magnets, prompting traditional US allies to seek alternatives to Chinese supply [para. 14]. Historically, China’s first-mover and cost advantages made equivalent investments elsewhere commercially unviable; for example, building a rare earth processing plant in Australia costs five times as much as in China, and the risk of China flooding the market has deterred competitors [para. 16][para. 17][para. 18]. However, the uncertainties of great power competition have elevated economic security as an overarching concept, making previously uncommercial endeavors now feasible [para. 19][para. 20].

5. Energy anxieties extend to ASEAN. Japanese PM Takaichi’s recent visits to Vietnam and Australia emphasized supply chain resilience for critical minerals [para. 21][para. 22]. At the first round of the ASEAN summit in 2025, the energy supply squeeze from the Iran war dominated the agenda, overshadowing traditional topics like the South China Sea [para. 23]. The host Philippines urged swift ratification of the ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement to enable sharing of energy reserves during crises [para. 24]. The safe and stable supply of critical minerals—including oil, gas, and rare earths—remains crucial for ASEAN’s industrialization [para. 25].

6. Malaysia, an ASEAN member with 18.18 million tons of rare earth reserves, is positioning itself in the global competition for critical minerals [para. 26]. Recent industry analysis notes that Malaysia’s mature refining capabilities for heavy rare earths make it a key link in Western efforts to de-risk from China across the supply chain [para. 27]. The article concludes that a new Asia-Pacific economic security net, with Australia and other middle powers, is quietly taking shape in response to energy and supply chain vulnerabilities [para. 28].