In Depth: Why the U.S. Is Targeting AI Chip Exports to China (AI Translation)

【周刊提前读】深度：美国第三轮围堵中国半导体供应链 为何锁定AI芯片？

The U.S. government's recent 200-page ban on semiconductor exports to China has sent shockwaves through the semiconductor industry with its unexpected timing, extensive reach, and formidable depth. A foreign storage manufacturer revealed ongoing negotiations with the U.S. government and their customers in China to mitigate the impact. This new ban, implemented on December 2 by the Bureau of Industry and Security, significantly heightens export controls, placing 140 Chinese entities on a restricted "Entity List," limiting 24 types of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and three software tools from being exported, and banning high-bandwidth memory (HBM) exports needed for AI chips to China [para. 1].

The new controls are considered the Biden administration’s most comprehensive and aggressive sanctions against China's semiconductor supply chain, described as a "fatal blow" to domestic capabilities. Previously, in October 2022, the U.S. had enforced similar restrictions focused on leading chip design companies and wafer manufacturers, barring exports of specific semiconductor equipment. In October 2023, further restrictions included adding 13 more Chinese companies to the list, expanding limitations related to computing power chips from the Dutch company ASML [para. 2][para. 3].

The U.S. actions aim at stifling China's advancements in emerging technologies like AI, impacting HBM exports—the core of contemporary AI models requiring elevated computational power—which without, China’s AI chip efficiency would dramatically dip. Although China can develop its AI products independently, experts expect a slowdown in progress and increased costs [para. 5][para. 7]. The current restrictions notably exclude AI chips of 7nm and below from wafer fabrication, amplifying speculation about imminent further controls [para. 6].

In response to the sanctions, China’s Ministry of Commerce declared their opposition and announced new countermeasures, halting the export of critical metals—gallium and germanium—to the U.S. [para. 8]. An existing U.S. Geological Survey study predicts that should China entirely halt gallium and germanium exports, the U.S. GDP could decline by $3.4 billion, predominantly affecting semiconductor device manufacturers [para. 9].

Amid these tensions, major Chinese industry associations admonished caution while procuring U.S. chips, indicating potential shifts to Chinese alternatives. With the U.S. semiconductor export market possibly moderating its grip due to these actions, there’s a consensus within Chinese semiconductor circles stressing self-reliance and forging indigenous innovation paths [para. 11][para. 12]. The sanctions appear motivated by curbing advanced Chinese technology sectors like 5G, AI, and supercomputing, previously targeting Huawei-owned HiSilicon and other prominent chip enterprises [para. 13][para. 14].

The Bureau of Industry and Security's (BIS) efforts include regulating HBM parameters, intending to limit semiconductor components crucial for high-bandwidth memory. Constraints also extend to semiconductor manufacturing equipment—a comprehensive blockage attempting to stall China's domestic supply chain [para. 15][para. 16]. HBM exports, falling under the Foreign Direct Product rule, require a license if they exceed set thresholds—a challenge for global manufacturers seeking market access in China [para. 17][para. 18].

This stringent regulatory environment influences China’s domestic efforts in semiconductor supply chain development, causing a pronounced shift towards utilizing domestic resources and preparing for extended isolation from U.S. technological inputs. Despite sanctions, Chinese semiconductor firms are progressing towards self-reliance, enhancing domestic capabilities proactively, hinting at longer-term resilience in developing their semiconductor industry [para. 27][para. 29].