Commentary: Future Opportunities in an Era of Great Upheaval

The article discusses the significant global upheaval occurring as the United States' position in the world order undergoes dramatic change, with wide-reaching implications for both global competition and China’s development. The author identifies this upheaval as a turning point in international relations, recalling that China’s peaceful rise and reform era depended greatly on the easing of Sino-U.S. tensions post-Cold War, which allowed China to seize new opportunities for development. [para. 1]

Historic milestones in U.S.-China relations are traced, from the first sending of Chinese students to America in the late 1970s, the formalization of diplomatic and trade ties in 1979, to China’s eventual accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. The story of Huachen China’s (CBA’s) successful IPO in New York in 1992 illustrates the economic integration between the two nations and the global confidence in China at the time. [para. 2]

The author provides a personal account of his educational experiences in the U.S. in the late 1980s, noting the generosity and openness of American society, and observes that America was then viewed as enormously wealthy and welcoming to foreigners. [para. 3]

America’s postwar zenith is placed in the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The author argues that, inevitably, what follows a peak is decline, noting that since the 1990s, many Americans feel disconnected from their country’s current state. The decline is visible in the rise of the “Rust Belt”—industrial regions marked by stagnation—reflecting transformational shifts in the U.S. economy. [para. 4][para. 5]

The prevailing view that U.S. deindustrialization was driven solely by cheaper Chinese labor is questioned. The author presents Switzerland as a counterexample, pointing out that high-income countries can weather globalization’s challenges if they adapt effectively, underscoring the importance of economic restructuring and retraining rather than attributing decline solely to external competition. [para. 6]

The author contends that America’s difficulties arise less from industrial decline per se and more from an inability to respond collectively, largely because resources have been diverted to sustaining global hegemony at the expense of domestic investment. The visible decay in cities such as San Francisco and the mismanagement of disasters like the California wildfires are cited as symptoms of institutional overstretch and governance failures. [para. 7][para. 8]

The article points out the dramatic reduction in the U.S. share of global GDP—from about 50% after World War II to 26% in 2024—as an indicator of America’s relative decline. The country now faces massive trade and fiscal deficits ($1.2 trillion and $36 trillion, respectively), which call into question the sustainability of its global leadership. [para. 9][para. 10]

“America First” is interpreted as a long-standing U.S. tradition of prioritizing domestic problems over foreign entanglements, though history shows the U.S. repeatedly pulled into world affairs despite isolationist tendencies. The article suggests the U.S. cannot sustain the post-WWII global order, as other countries increasingly reject American dominance. [para. 11][para. 12]

Uncertainty surrounds the future global order, with the “Thucydides Trap”—the theory that conflict between a reigning and a rising power (U.S. and China) is likely—gaining renewed attention. However, some cases have avoided war through prudent strategies, and the author highlights that the current era may be less “peace and development” than one marked by increasing conflict. [para. 13][para. 14][para. 15]

The geopolitical views of theorists like John J. Mearsheimer are discussed, emphasizing the logic of great power competition. The author critiques Mearsheimer for insufficient realism concerning internal changes in America and suggests the U.S. would benefit from a more significant retrenchment to focus on domestic renewal. [para. 16][para. 17]

Nevertheless, retrenchment is difficult due to entrenched interests and the inertia of global commitments, as seen in the Vietnam War. The complexity of distinguishing purely domestic from international interests clouds the effectiveness of “America First” policies. [para. 18][para. 19]

Ultimately, regardless of political direction, economics remains central. Historical examples illustrate how crisis, migration, and even war drive prosperity and reorder economic centers. The author argues that ordinary people’s adaptive responses will shape the outcome of this new era of upheaval. [para. 20][para. 21]

The article is adapted from a 2025 speech by Zhou Qiren, a Chinese economist, and reflects his personal perspectives. [para. 22][para. 23][para. 24]