Commentary: To End ‘Excessive Competition,’ China Must Cure Its Economic Imbalance
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Market competition is an indispensable part of a market economy. However, the “excessive competition” seen in China today extends beyond normal competitive behavior.
Take the photovoltaic industry, where China has established a leading global position, having nearly eliminated its rivals. In theory, it should be enjoying high monopoly profits. The reality is that even with substantial government subsidies, companies are selling products below cost in both domestic and international markets, leading to annual losses in the billions or even tens of billions of yuan. This phenomenon seriously violates the basic principles of market competition.
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- Excessive competition in China, especially in sectors like photovoltaics, leads to losses despite global dominance, due to supply-demand imbalances and low consumption (household consumption is just 38% of GDP).
- Key causes include insufficient domestic demand, skewed fiscal priorities, lack of corporate innovation, and local government intervention through subsidies and incentives.
- Solutions proposed are shifting fiscal focus to public welfare, boosting consumption, encouraging innovation, reducing government supply-side intervention, and addressing cultural attitudes on competition.
Market competition is fundamental to a market economy, but China currently faces “excessive competition,” which goes beyond normal market behavior and undermines the sector's overall health. A striking example is the photovoltaic industry, where despite near-monopoly status and substantial state subsidies, companies sell at losses, violating basic market principles and leading to billions or even tens of billions of yuan in annual industry losses. This pattern reflects structural weaknesses in China’s macroeconomic environment and the prevailing form of government intervention[para. 1][para. 2].
A key underlying issue is insufficient aggregate domestic demand, as already singled out by policymakers. Structural imbalances persist: household consumption constitutes only 38% of GDP, the lowest globally and 20-30 percentage points below typical international levels. Even including government and corporate consumption, the share only reaches 54%. In contrast, China manufactures 31% of global industrial goods but only consumes 14% of them. This disconnect fuels both domestic and international overcapacity and competition[para. 3][para. 4][para. 5].
Current fiscal measures are inadequate, still emphasizing traditional infrastructure spending rather than public welfare, echoing early 20th-century American “New Deal” policies. Historical lessons suggest stronger focus on direct support to household consumption—such as through vouchers or cash grants—can generate a much larger economic multiplier (three to five times that of investment-focused subsidies). Meanwhile, monetary policy remains too conservative, with excessive priority given to exchange rate stability and bank profitability at the expense of broader macroeconomic objectives like economic growth and employment. Globally, no major economy has prioritized bank profits over economic recovery during downturns[para. 6][para. 7][para. 8][para. 9][para. 10][para. 11][para. 12][para. 13].
For these reasons, the author argues that fiscal and monetary policy should strongly pivot toward stimulating domestic demand, with an accelerated pace of reform. Without significantly expanding domestic consumption, “excessive competition” will likely persist[para. 14].
Another core challenge is a lack of innovation among Chinese enterprises. Chinese businesses have relied heavily on late-mover strategies such as cost-cutting and price competition—approaches now insufficient in China’s post-industrial, post-urbanization phase. Many entrepreneurs lack familiarity and comfort with innovation management and are reluctant to risk investment in new R&D, instead defaulting to traditional production function models. Education—both at universities and in executive MBA programs—lags in teaching innovation management, further delaying corporate transformation and reinforcing “excessive competition”[para. 15][para. 16][para. 17][para. 18][para. 19][para. 20][para. 21].
Local governments exacerbate the problem by using old tactics—free land, cheap energy, flashy tax breaks, vast subsidies—to attract investment, especially in already-saturated sectors. The heavy annual public spending on production and export subsidies often exceeds direct support to consumers, reflecting a misplaced focus and deep-rooted mindset issues at all levels of government. True reform, the author suggests, requires a radical shift in government involvement—from subsidizing oversupply to supporting consumption and long-term innovation[para. 22][para. 23][para. 24][para. 25][para. 26][para. 27][para. 28].
Cultural phenomena such as “involution”—the relentless, often self-defeating pursuit of incremental advantage—compound the economic challenges. Respect for labor costs, both at the managerial and worker level, is lacking, further distorting competition. The author stresses that resolving “excessive competition” requires establishing fair labor compensation and transitioning to sustainable business practices[para. 29][para. 30][para. 31][para. 32][para. 33][para. 34].
However, the excessive competition problem is likely a transitional phase. As China advances innovation management and shifts policy focus to consumption and sustainable growth, industries are expected to evolve beyond this stage—mirroring the transformation already observed in the white goods sector. The photovoltaic and EV sectors may soon follow suit, embracing innovation-led growth and ushering in a new era for the Chinese economy[para. 35][para. 36][para. 37][para. 38].
- Apple
- Apple is mentioned as a company whose supply chain guarantees gross profit margins for Chinese consumer electronics companies acting as contract manufacturers. This contrasts with contracting for domestic companies, which often yields meager profits. The article suggests that respect for human costs is a pressing issue and that ensuring reasonable profits, like those seen in Apple's supply chain, is crucial for sustainable business development.
- Nvidia
- The article mentions Nvidia as a company in Silicon Valley known for continuously producing innovative results. This is presented in the context of contrasting it with certain Chinese enterprises that are less familiar with innovation-based management models.
- Huawei
- Huawei, a Chinese tech giant, transformed from a telecommunications equipment manufacturer in the 1990s into a company with significant research and development outputs. It's cited as an example of a Chinese company that generates innovative results, similar to Silicon Valley firms like Nvidia.
- Midea
- Midea is cited as an example of a Chinese white goods company that, alongside Gree and Haier, has successfully navigated intense market competition. These companies have established strong brands, global sales networks, and pricing power, demonstrating profitability and product innovation. This indicates their ability to move beyond "excessive competition" by focusing on innovation and brand building.
- Gree
- The article notes that Gree is a Chinese domestic company in the white goods industry. It has successfully established its own brand, built global sales networks, and gained pricing power. Gree is highlighted as an example of a company that has moved beyond fierce competition through product innovation and now enjoys good profits.
- Haier
- Haier, a domestic company in the white goods industry, has successfully transformed from an era of fierce competition. Alongside Midea and Gree, Haier has established its own brands, boasts global sales networks, commands pricing power, achieves good profits, and demonstrates product innovation. This evolution suggests a path for other industries to move beyond "excessive competition" towards an innovation-driven growth model.
- 1930s:
- The US responded to the Great Depression with Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ infrastructure investments to expand domestic demand.
- 1960s and '70s:
- US President Lyndon B. Johnson launched the ‘Great Society’ program focused on public welfare.
- 1990s:
- Huawei began transforming from a telecommunications equipment manufacturer into a technology giant through increased R&D investment.
- Around 2008:
- The US adopted policies like direct cash distributions and quantitative easing in response to financial and economic crises.
- 2025:
- The Economic Work Conference prioritized boosting consumption, improving investment efficiency, and expanding domestic demand.
- 2025:
- There have been calls for issuing several hundred billion yuan in consumption vouchers, but such vouchers remain small in scale compared to investment and export subsidies.
- As of 2025:
- China remains the world leader in the photovoltaic industry, but companies continue to sell products below cost despite substantial government subsidies, causing annual losses in the billions or tens of billions of yuan.
- As of 2025:
- Chinese universities and Executive MBA programs still lack sufficient education in innovation management methods, hindering corporate transformation and innovation.
- By 2025:
- The Central Economic Work Conference has identified expanding domestic demand as a priority.
- By 2025:
- China's white goods industry has largely ended its period of excessive competition; major companies like Midea, Gree, and Haier have established brands and global networks.
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