In Depth: Tainted Baby Cream Exposes a Flaw in China’s Fight Against Shoddy Goods

1. In April 2023, police from Yulin in Guangxi province traveled nearly 1,000 miles to Zhengzhou, Henan province, as part of a probe into a tainted children’s cream that raised significant public and regulatory alarm. The focus of their investigation was Zhang Jinjin, general manager at Henan Kangfuyuan Pharmaceutical Technology Co., which had supplied the problematic product [para. 1].

2. The culmination of this investigation occurred after a five-year saga surrounding Qianzhi Herbal Cream, a children’s cosmetic popular for treating eczema and diaper rash. Regulatory testing had found the cream adulterated with ciprofloxacin, a powerful antibiotic banned in cosmetics due to the danger of fostering drug-resistant bacteria in infants [para. 2]. The case culminated in February (2026) with two top executives handed prison sentences of up to seven years. Notably, the legal proceedings centered as much on the scrutiny and admissibility of evidence as on the crime itself, exposing ambiguities in China’s judicial process, particularly the acceptance of administrative inspection reports as proof in criminal cases [para. 3].

3. The origins of the crisis trace back to 2021, when China’s National Medical Products Administration flagged the cream during a risk monitoring sweep. The product belonged to Yulin-based Qianzhi Herbal Cosmetics Co., headed by Wang Hui. Between 2017 and 2020, Wang had outsourced production to Zhang’s Kangfuyuan, purchasing semi-finished cream in bulk for 380–400 yuan ($55–$58) per 50-kg barrel [para. 4][para. 5]. Prosecutors later found that Zhang’s company deliberately added ciprofloxacin to boost the cream’s efficacy before selling it to Wang, who then arranged packaging elsewhere and sold the final product for 45 yuan per jar online [para. 6].

4. Regulatory action began in December 2021, when authorities in Guangxi fined Qianzhi 20,000 yuan and seized illegal profits. The case advanced to police in June 2022, leading first to the arrest of Wang and an intermediary, Wang Wei, followed by Zhang and his staff [para. 7].

5. The prosecution’s case was anchored on four laboratory reports from two testing institutions confirming the presence of the banned antibiotic [para. 9]. Defense lawyers challenged the sufficiency of these administrative reports for criminal prosecution, noting manual alterations in the documentation, lack of chain-of-custody records, differences between the form of ciprofloxacin cited in charges and that detected, and argued for higher forensic standards in criminal litigation [para. 10][para. 11][para. 12].

6. The court issued a nuanced decision: it excluded three Guangzhou institute reports due to faulty chain-of-custody and lack of accreditation yet upheld the Yulin center’s report, maintaining that administrative evidence was admissible and the distinction between chemical forms irrelevant to the ban in question [para. 13].

7. Sentences were delivered in late 2025 and early 2026. The court found the defendants guilty but scaled back the alleged financial scope of the crime from over 4 million to 1.35 million yuan. Wang Hui was found responsible for 952,000 yuan and Zhang for 400,000 yuan [para. 15][para. 16]. Wang received seven years in prison, Wang Wei six and a half, and Zhang’s sentence was reduced to three years and four months after a guilty plea and payment of fines. His deputy was sentenced to two years and nine months [para. 17][para. 18].

8. More broadly, the case highlights systemic flaws in China’s approach to distinguishing administrative violations from criminal offenses, particularly regarding the adequacy of inspection reports used as criminal evidence [para. 19][para. 20]. Scholars argue for higher evidentiary standards, careful judicial discretion, and note that administrative reports are insufficient to deprive individuals of liberty [para. 21][para. 22][para. 23].

9. Official skepticism about China’s quality control industry was reflected in January 2026, when the State Administration for Market Regulation revoked the credentials of over 400 testing agencies from the previous year, citing widespread data fabrication [para. 25].