Exclusive: First Chinese Cargo Ship Crosses Iran’s Hormuz ‘Safe Corridor’

1. In late March 2024, Iran established a de facto “safe” shipping corridor through its territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz, enabling the first Chinese-owned cargo vessel to successfully transit the passage on March 23. The vessel, named Newvoyager and registered under a Panama flag but owned by a Chinese company, publicly declared its Chinese ownership during the journey. This marked a significant development in the wake of recent tensions and disruptions in the traditional shipping lanes of one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. [para. 1][para. 2]

2. The “safe corridor,” instituted on March 13, runs between Iran’s Larak and Qeshm islands and diverts vessels from the deeper, main shipping lanes in the strait. Iran uses this corridor to vet, screen, and sometimes collect fees from ships passing through. Later, on March 23, three commercial tankers (one Chinese-owned, two Indian-owned) exited the Persian Gulf via this corridor – the first such fleet transit since Iran had effectively blockaded the strait at the start of March. The Chinese vessel, Bright Gold, primarily serves Iran-related business rather than international commercial activity. [para. 3][para. 4][para. 5][para. 6]

3. The passage of these and other vessels provides hope for Chinese shipowners still stranded in the Persian Gulf. Previously, ships could only transit the strait individually, but advancing Iranian screening mechanisms now allow several to pass simultaneously. Approximately 10 Chinese cargo ships have been waiting for clearance at the strait’s western entrance, seeking transit negotiations with Iranian authorities. [para. 7][para. 8][para. 9][para. 10]

4. The first Chinese-flagged bulk carrier to exit the strait after its closure was Run Chen 2 on March 11, accompanied by three other Chinese-operated bulk carriers. At one stage, vessels with “China Owner” identifiers made up nearly half of all non-Iranian ships navigating the area. However, following a March 12 incident in which a Chinese-owned container ship was struck by shrapnel, Chinese ship traffic in the strait temporarily ceased. [para. 11][para. 12]

5. Despite risks, on March 16, the Chinese-operated VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) Kai Jing completed a thousand-mile detour to Saudi Arabia, becoming the first Chinese-funded VLCC to return oil from the Middle East Gulf since hostilities began, highlighting the difficulties and adaptability of Chinese shipping operations in the region’s tense environment. [para. 13]

6. The Iranian authorities and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have clarified since the blockade on March 1 that their actions would target vessels from hostile nations (notably the US and Israel), while allowing ships from friendly nations to pass. However, determining the status of ships remains complex. The Larak-Qeshm waterway allows Iranian authorities to screen and approve vessels, with over 20 ships using this route between March 13 and 22, mostly Iranian-flagged or affiliated, followed by Indian and Pakistani ships. Significant fees are sometimes involved, such as $2 million reported for a single transit. [para. 14][para. 15][para. 16][para. 17][para. 18][para. 19]

7. During the corridor’s first 10 days, no Chinese cargo ships passed through, while Indian operators dominated non-Iranian transits. Chinese shipowners have faced challenges adapting to Iran’s processes, but as experience grows, improved communication and greater transit capacity are anticipated. [para. 20][para. 21]

8. Chinese shipping companies are now in daily discussions on safety and commercial decisions regarding strait passage, with the Chinese government actively negotiating with Iran for resumed transits, especially for oil tankers. Several large Chinese vessels, including COSCO Shipping’s supertankers and massive container ships, remain stranded in the region, holding nearly 4 million tons of crude oil and large cargoes like vehicles. Many have assembled and await official guidelines to proceed. [para. 22][para. 23][para. 24][para. 25][para. 26]

9. Contacts for further information are provided at the close of the article. [para. 27]