Commentary: China’s U.S. Import Dependence Is Narrowing Unevenly

1. Export controls rely on market dominance over key commodities like U.S. semiconductors, supercomputing, and aircraft parts, amplified by concentrated supply chains where 40% of importing economies depend on three or fewer nations per product, per a 2023 McKinsey report [para. 1]. For China, targeted by U.S. controls, assessing U.S. goods reliance reveals pushback strategies and vulnerabilities from import dependencies [para. 2].

2. U.S. export controls on China evolved from 2013-2025 across administrations, restricting strategic and non-strategic goods, prompting China to diversify partners and pursue self-sufficiency [para. 3][para. 4]. Strategic imports from U.S. declined overall, except chemicals where reliance consistently dropped [para. 5].

3. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measures import concentration, with ≥3,000 indicating high dependency [para. 7]. In 2025, China's imports show 48.3% of HS 2-digit chapters >3,000 HHI, e.g., 91.7% in HS Chapter 90 (photographic goods) [para. 8]. At HS 6-digit, 62% of U.S. imports exceed 3,000, especially machinery/electricals and aircraft parts (50%) [para. 9]. HS Chapter 84 has 299 high-tech items >3,000 HHI, including turbojets (HS 8411) and machining centers (HS 8457) [para. 10].

4. U.S. policy consistency on strategic exports persisted despite administration changes [para. 11][para. 12]. China recognizes U.S. "strangleholds," addressing risks via Five-Year Plans and Made in China 2025, targeting ten critical sectors needing machinery, chemicals, electronics, etc. [para. 13][para. 14]. Still, 158 strategic categories retain >30% U.S. dependency in 2025, e.g., aircraft parts, turbojets [para. 15].

5. China reduced U.S. imports in other areas, like trimethyl phosphite (semiconductors/glass) and tantalum (capacitors), where U.S. share grew 61% and 23% (2013-2017) but volumes fell >60% (2022-2024) [para. 17][para. 18][para. 19]. The 15th Five-Year Plan adds AI, biomanufacturing (HS 8479.89, reliant on EU/Japan/S. Korea), aerospace, semiconductors, quantum [para. 20][para. 21].

6. China's responses include 2016 sanctions mirroring U.S., 2020 Export Control Law, and restrictions on rare earths [para. 22]. Decoupling from U.S. chemicals/machinery/optics accelerated post-sanctions, targeting tantalum/silver nitrate, but vulnerabilities persist in lithium, turbojets, titanium, optical fibers due to limited alternatives [para. 23][para. 24].

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