1. Shipping companies with vessels stranded in the Persian Gulf have begun receiving preliminary rules for passing through the Strait of Hormuz, including a requirement to submit vessel information to Iran and obtain a unique transit code before crossing [para. 1]. These rules emerged from discussions involving the UN’s IMO, major shipping companies, and Gulf coastal states, following a U.S.-Iran agreement reached during high-level talks in Switzerland [para. 2]. A shipping-company executive noted that Iran is currently prioritizing Iranian-flagged vessels and tankers with cooperative ties, leading to long wait times for international vessels [para. 3][para. 4]. The IMO is working on a voluntary safe-passage framework to allow stranded vessels to leave, upholding the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, and has drawn up a list of stranded vessels with parties expected to avoid attacks during evacuation [para. 5][para. 6]. As of Wednesday morning, 2,622 vessels with a combined capacity of 40.39 million deadweight tons (about 1.4% of the global fleet) remained stranded [para. 7]. Iran’s permanent representative stated the strait is fully open with no tolls for 60 days, after which terms depend on the outcome of U.S.-Iran negotiations [para. 8][para. 9]. Under the preliminary rules, vessels must submit ownership information, flag details, crew lists, cargo manifests, and voyage plans via Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy online system at least 72 hours before transit, and will be released in batches to avoid congestion [para. 10]. Iran, Oman, and the IMO have also established a joint emergency command center to handle vessel breakdowns, maritime standoffs, and any sudden collapse of the ceasefire [para. 11].
2. Two-way traffic through the strait began gradually resuming on June 22, with three Qatari LNG carriers—Mekaines, Mesaimeer, and Al Sadd—entering the Persian Gulf and arriving at Qatari ports on June 23 [para. 14]. Shipping-industry participants viewed the return of Qatari LNG fleet as a signal of reopening, noting Qatar and Iran do not have a particularly good relationship and LNG carriers are high-value targets [para. 15][para. 16]. Data showed that on June 22, 16 cargo vessels with a combined capacity of nearly 2 million deadweight tons entered the strait, the highest daily level since the war began [para. 17]. On June 23, international vessels began leaving in batches; non-Iranian international vessels accounted for more than 60% of ships passing through that day for the first time since the restart [para. 18][para. 19]. Most vessels now need Iranian approval to pass, and some can apply to Oman to use the southern channel after securing Iranian approval, though criteria remain unclear [para. 20]. Earlier, between June 18 and 20, tankers from South Korea and Saudi Arabia had begun using the Oman-side channel among a group of vessels from several countries allowed through by Iran [para. 21].
3. Shipping executives note the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to return to the prewar model of free navigation, citing five fundamental changes [para. 23]. First, passage rights have shifted from free transit to controlled approval; vessels must now report in advance and undergo background checks, with Iran having unilateral approval authority based on flag, ownership, and relationship with Tehran [para. 24][para. 25]. Second, routing has changed from free selection among multiple lanes to mandatory designated channels; most ships are directed to the northern channel under Iranian military monitoring, likely making congestion normal [para. 26]. Third, costs are likely to rise; while no transit fees are charged during the 60-day temporary arrangement, Iran may charge for future services, and war-risk insurance premiums remain elevated [para. 27]. Fourth, armed patrols and boarding inspections may become routine; vessels could face random inspections by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps patrol boats to verify crew, cargo, and ownership [para. 28]. Fifth, coastal-state control has been strengthened while international maritime rules have taken a step back; Iran and Oman gain far greater control over shipping services, creating a framework where coastal-state authority takes precedence over international norms [para. 29].
AI generated, for reference only
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