1. [para. 1] In mid-August, Chinese shipping company Sea Legend said it would start a container service through the Arctic, transiting Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR) to sail from China to Rotterdam in about 20 days, roughly half the time needed via the Suez Canal. While Chinese ships had previously made exploratory and irregular voyages along the NSR, this new service marks the first regularly scheduled commercial transit of the Arctic Ocean.
2. [para. 2] The planned scale is relatively small: the fleet consists of seven modestly sized container ships operating for four months a year, and Arctic vessels are about a fifth of the size of those passing through the Suez Canal, which carries roughly an eighth of world trade. The significance is that Arctic transits can now be scheduled, priced and repeated, allowing the route to be integrated into supply chains. Its appeal is likely to grow as traditional routes such as the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz become riskier.
3. [para. 3] The NSR differs from other routes in that, de facto, freedom of navigation does not apply. Russia does not treat it as an open international waterway and controls the bulk of the route. Russia issues permits and collects fees through its state nuclear company Rosatom, which operates the heavy icebreakers needed to escort cargo ships through icy waters.
4. [para. 4] The United States has argued for decades that Russia’s expansive claim over these waters is inconsistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and that the NSR should be treated as an international strait. By operating via the route and complying with Russia’s required fees and permits, China now implicitly acknowledges and legitimises the Russian position.
5. [para. 5] China is not an Arctic state, though it has observer status in the Arctic Council. Its Arctic access depends heavily on Russia, and for the NSR it depends fully on Russia. In most other arenas, Moscow plays the junior partner to Beijing, but in the Arctic Russia has opened its most strategic waterway in exchange for transit fees, joint shipbuilding, crew training and political alignment. Russia controls access, but it is selling it under economic duress from Western sanctions.
6. [para. 6] The U.S. has long anticipated this development and is examining alternative Arctic routes. The Northwest Passage through Canadian Arctic waters is hampered by erratic weather and shallow water, and is subject to a dispute similar to the NSR: Washington wants it treated as an international strait, while Ottawa treats it as internal waters. The Transpolar Sea Route runs through the centre of the Arctic Ocean, avoiding any country’s jurisdiction, but remoteness and remaining sea ice hinder its feasibility.
7. [para. 7] Other options require heavy icebreakers, where the U.S. lags badly. Russia operates the world’s largest icebreaker fleet, with more than 40 polar vessels, though many are ageing. China has three icebreakers, one domestically built, and is adding a nuclear-powered vessel. The U.S. has only one functioning heavy icebreaker and one medium icebreaker. It is trying to catch up with a $6.1 billion contract with Finland for 11 medium icebreakers, seven of which will be built in the U.S. and four in Finnish shipyards.
8. [para. 8] The disparity in Arctic shipping illustrates a broader geopolitical reality: China’s lead is derived from its industrial capacity. In shipbuilding, drones, batteries and other scalable production, it is outpacing the U.S. The icebreaker shortfall shows the U.S. lacks an industrial base that can build what strategy requires.
9. [para. 9] China’s new Arctic shipping route is not only a result of its geography; it is also a consequence of Russia’s dependence on China and of Chinese economic and industrial muscle. Both advantages are products of deliberate Chinese strategy. For the U.S. and still more for Europe, the Arctic shows that industrial capacity, economic weight and negotiated access have become central factors in geopolitical competition.
10. [para. 10][para. 11] The article was written by Alicia García-Herrero, Senior Fellow at Bruegel and Adjunct Professor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and was first published by Bruegel on Aug. 24.
AI generated, for reference only
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