China’s Population Decline Accelerates as Births Hit Modern-Era Low in 2025

China’s demographic decline accelerated in 2025, as the country’s population fell by 3.39 million to reach 1.40489 billion at year-end. This marks the fourth consecutive year of contraction for the world’s second-largest economy, with the number of births dropping sharply to a modern-era low of 7.92 million, down 1.62 million from 2024. The ongoing decrease highlights severe demographic challenges, including a shrinking labor force and a rapidly aging society, which threaten long-term economic growth and sustainability. [para. 1][para. 2][para. 3][para. 4]

The data from the National Bureau of Statistics underscores a stark imbalance: the number of deaths in 2025 was 11.31 million—yielding a death rate of 8.04 per 1,000 people—while the birth rate was just 5.63 per 1,000, resulting in a natural population growth rate of -2.41 per 1,000. The gender ratio remained imbalanced, with 716.85 million males compared to 688.04 million females, or 104.19 men for every 100 women. [para. 5][para. 6]

Experts had anticipated a birth decline, especially after a brief uptick in 2024—attributed to the traditional preference for Year of the Dragon births and a backlog post-pandemic—but the sustained downward trajectory has not been reversed. Notably, the number of marriage registrations, an indicator of future births, reached a historic low in 2024, foreshadowing 2025’s significant birth drop. The scale of the decline, however, surpassed even pessimistic forecasts. [para. 7][para. 8][para. 9]

Huang Wenzheng, executive director of the YuWa Population Research Institute, estimates that the fertility rate plunged from 1.1 in 2024 to approximately 0.96 in 2025. A fertility rate of 2.1 is considered the “replacement level” for population stability, and anything below 1.5 signals a potentially irreversible “low-fertility trap.” Huang points out that, although the government has introduced child care subsidies and incentives, these measures are currently insufficient to reverse or even stabilize the declining fertility trend. [para. 10][para. 11][para. 12][para. 13]

Demographically, China’s population is aging rapidly: in 2025, 23% (323.38 million) were aged 60 and above—up from 22% in 2024 and crossing the 20% “moderately aged” threshold in 2023. Of these, 15.9% (223.65 million) were 65 or older. Working-age individuals (aged 16–59) constituted 60.6% (851.36 million) of the population. Projections estimate that, by 2035, those aged 60 and over may reach 420 million, surpassing 30% and marking China as “heavily aged” by international standards. [para. 14][para. 15][para. 16]

Structural imbalances are at the core of this crisis, according to Shi Zhilei, vice president of the China Population Association. The rapid fall in newborn numbers is expected to deplete the future labor force, aggravate the aging crisis, and escalate the burden on social support mechanisms—ultimately threatening China’s economic competitiveness. If unaddressed, Huang warns, the death-to-birth ratio could reach as high as 7:1 or 8:1 in coming decades, leading to further demographic collapse. [para. 17][para. 18][para. 19][para. 20]

To reverse this trend, Huang advocates both micro- and macro-level interventions. He proposes government bonds to provide significant financial incentives for child-rearing, effectively making it a viable “profession,” and calls for specialized government departments to address demographic shifts. Huang stresses that families and individuals alone cannot shoulder the burden, emphasizing the need for coordinated, robust policy responses. [para. 21][para. 22][para. 23][para. 24]