1. [para. 1][para. 2] At the end of 2025, Lawson Inc. had about 7,000 stores in China, maintaining its lead over foreign rivals 7-Eleven and FamilyMart in the country’s foreign-invested convenience-store sector [para. 1]. However, leadership of this position is transitioning; Vice President Takashi Fujiwara is set to succeed President Motonobu Miyake, who is retiring after 14 years at the helm [para. 2]. Miyake rated his tenure a 70 out of 100, the missing 30 points owed mainly to the target of 10,000 stores by 2025 that the company failed to hit [para. 2].
2. [para. 3][para. 4][para. 16][para. 17][para. 18][para. 20] Fujiwara earned the promotion through his success managing South China’s Guangdong province, the company’s hardest battleground, where domestic brands and 7-Eleven were already thoroughly entrenched [para. 3]. He pushed Lawson across the Pearl River Delta by pioneering a light-asset expansion model centered on the "Ministation"—converting existing mom-and-pop shops into branded outlets for roughly 40,000 yuan, compared to 350,000 yuan for a standard store [para. 16][para. 17]. The other key element was a localized fresh food supply chain, offering items like rice balls and bento boxes that competitors selling standardized packaged goods could not easily copy [para. 18][para. 19]. He aimed for roughly 70% of products to reflect local tastes, adapting inventories to the subtropical climate by expanding cold drinks and late-night snacks to suit Guangzhou’s long summers and active nightlife [para. 20][para. 21].
3. [para. 4][para. 5][para. 23][para. 24][para. 25][para. 27][para. 28] The core question is whether this regional playbook can be scaled nationally, given sharp differences in consumer habits, supply chains, and franchisee quality across the country [para. 4][para. 5]. Fujiwara takes over as the entire industry enters a fight over a shrinking pie; in the first half of 2026, foot traffic fell for over 70% of convenience-store companies and net profit declined for nearly 60% due to competition from on-demand retail and discount stores [para. 23]. The light-asset model that fuelled growth also exposed its limits: a finite supply of quality mom-and-pop stores, inconsistent execution among converted franchisees, and weak brand loyalty that makes operators vulnerable to a competitor’s better offer [para. 24][para. 25]. This strain is evident in Lawson’s books, with its Anhui joint venture posting losses for three consecutive years [para. 27]. The era of rapid flag-planting has ended, shifting focus to wringing steady profit from each location. While store targets of 10,000 by 2028 and 12,000 by early 2031 remain, the immediate priority is single-store profitability, franchisee returns, and the disciplined execution of its plans [para. 28].
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