1. Before the 2026 midterms, the author met American China experts in Singapore, who described three layers of the U.S. approach: leaders engaging in dialogue, hawks in policy circles demanding a harder line, and ordinary Americans more focused on the domestic economy and cost of living—some even finding Chinese life “cool” on social media. [para. 1][para. 2][para. 3] One analyst predicted China would rarely be raised in the midterms, testing whether shifts in public attitudes filter through to Washington. [para. 4][para. 5][para. 6]
2. The campaign showed China had not disappeared. Both parties used “soft on China” as a political weapon, though such attacks were not ubiquitous. [para. 8][para. 9] Republicans attacked California Democrat Derek Tran over tariffs and Texas Democrat James Talarico over Chinese land purchases; Talarico, a newcomer, still won Texas by a wide margin—the state’s first Democratic Senate victory since 1988. [para. 10][para. 11][para. 12] Democrats used a Mandarin-language ad against Mississippi Republican Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith over farmland purchases; it was an allegation, not established fact, but it showed the charge’s utility. [para. 13][para. 14]
3. Economic questions accompanied the attacks. In Iowa, Democrat Josh Turek blamed Trump’s tariffs for hurting agricultural exports, while Republican Ashley Hinson defended holding Beijing accountable. [para. 15][para. 16] In North Carolina, Democrat Don Davis demanded a verifiable timetable for China’s promised soybean purchases. [para. 17]
4. Even AI infrastructure gained a China dimension. Trump argued data centers not built in America could end up in China, but local debate centered on tax breaks for facilities and whether electricity demand and grid-expansion costs would fall on residents. [para. 18][para. 19][para. 20] The national imperative of “not losing to China” did not answer who pays. [para. 20]
5. China’s role varied over recent elections: central to Trump’s 2016 narrative on manufacturing and trade deficits, fueled by the pandemic in 2020, and widespread by 2022. [para. 21][para. 22][para. 23] Wesleyan Media Project found China in 8.9% of Republican Senate TV-ad airings between June 20 and Aug. 7, 2022, behind the economy (38.2%), inflation (36.2%), and immigration (22.9%). [para. 24][para. 25]
6. Public opinion is shifting. A Pew survey in March 2026 found 71% unfavorable and 27% favorable—down 12 points from 83% unfavorable in 2023, with favorable up from 14% in 2023 to 21% in 2025 and 27% in 2026. [para. 26][para. 27] Partisan and age gaps are stark: 34% of Democrats/Democratic-leaning respondents view China favorably vs. 18% of Republicans/Republican leaners; in January, 14% of Democrats/Democratic leaners called China an “enemy” (half the 2024 level) vs. 44% of Republicans/Republican leaners; a September 2026 Pew survey rated China 37/100 overall (up from 28 in 2021), 42 among under-50s and 31 among older Americans. [para. 28][para. 29][para. 30][para. 31]
7. Chicago Council surveys show policy preferences moving: support for friendly cooperation and engagement with China rose from 40% in 2024 to 53% in 2025 and 57% in 2026, while support for limiting China’s power fell to 40%. [para. 32][para. 33][para. 34] Cooperation support remains below 2010s levels but has recovered substantially from 2020-24 lows. [para. 34]
8. Washington China specialists are preparing for the post-midterm and post-Trump era. Trump pays little heed to think-tank researchers; as his political influence weakens, Ali Wyne and Ryan Hass warned in a Foreign Affairs essay, “Don’t Go Backward on China Policy,” that critics might overcorrect with tougher China positions ahead of the 2028 campaign, narrowing room for diplomacy. [para. 35][para. 36][para. 37][para. 38][para. 39] They counseled focusing on managing competition, U.S. capabilities, and long-term interdependence. [para. 39] The essay contrasts Washington’s “competition to be won” view with most Americans’ “reality to be managed” view—a question the next two years will answer. [para. 40][para. 41]
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