Opinion: Four Questions About the Taliban and China’s Interests in Afghanistan

Editor’s note: Since the Taliban took over Kabul, there has been strong interest in China on the future of Afghanistan. Ma Xiaolin, a scholar on international affairs and director of the Institute for Studies on the Mediterranean Rim, shares his views in a Q&A.

Since its founding around three decades ago, has the Taliban changed at all?

The Taliban still hold to their conservative doctrines. The organization follows orthodox and very traditional religious doctrines.

After more than 20 years of drifting from place to place, the Taliban have realized that they needs to change policies to alter their image. However, this is only limited to policy adjustments, as the Taliban’s doctrine wills always be conservative.

There are some changes within Taliban — the division from inside the organization has become more serious. Several factions have been established, including local, overseas, combined and hardline factions. Meanwhile, different factions have mingled with various other forces: pro-Saudi, pro-UAE, pro-Turkish, or pro-Pakistani. The Taliban is no longer what it used to be during the Obama administration.

At present, the Taliban has to deal with two issues, settling internal disputes and reforming itself. In order to have a chance to integrate into modern society, it is vital for the Taliban to implement reforms. If it wants to be a member of the international community, the Taliban cannot rule Afghanistan as it did in the past.

Since its internal division has become more serious, how will the Taliban be able to unite all its forces?

First, the Taliban’s high-level organization is called the “Shura,” meaning “consultation.” Shura is the decision-making organization composed of the leaders of the Taliban, making them strongly influential.

Second, since the Taliban have mainly been in charge of rural areas, it has been relatively free from control and has expanded its organization through alleged drug trafficking. According to media reports, if soldiers of the Afghan government forces can earn an income of $100, then Taliban fighters can be provided with $300. For many soldiers, joining the army is a job, so why would they not prefer a higher-paying option? The Taliban use the proceeds from drug trafficking to pay fighters and to attract more people to join.

Third, the Taliban is an armed force that is both political and religious, and most members have been instilled with strong religious ideas and are therefore ready to fight to save the Islamic land. This makes the soldiers of the Taliban are more effective in combat than the utilitarian and corrupt government army and its unmotivated soldiers.

In contrast, there is also visible internal friction within the Kabul government. When (former Afghan President Ashraf) Ghani came to power in August 2014, he announced the formation of a government of national unity with rival Abdullah Abdullah, with Ghani as president and Abdullah Abdullah as the newly established chief executive. This set-up of “a government led by a two-headed regime,” something that has never occurred before in any other country, reflects the intractable factional struggle within the Afghan government.

As the Taliban takes over Afghanistan, how will Afghanistan maintain stability in the future?

If the Taliban regains power, they are likely to restore the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, where they can continue the old caesaropapism regime with the country’s main ethnic group, the Pashtuns, in control. However, in terms of maintaining long-term security and stability in the region, the construction of a new Afghanistan must take into account complex ethnic, religious, factional and other factors, otherwise, ensuring lasting stability will be an impossible task.

In the area north of the Hindu Kush Mountains in Afghanistan live Tajik, Uzbeks, Turkmen and other ethnic minorities, accounting for about 39% of Afghanistan’s total population. Living on the south of the Hindu Kush Mountains are mainly Pashtuns, who account for 42% of Afghanistan’s population. And not all Pashtuns are part of the Taliban.

There exist fierce factional struggles among the Pashtuns, who are generally divided into three factions: The first is Karzai’s faction, whose main sphere of influence is in Kabul, the capital, and the eastern region bordering Pakistan. The second is Abdullah’s faction in the south, including Kandahar. The third is led by the two families that claim to be descendants of Mahmud, the emperor of the Ghaznavid Dynasty, and to represent the “holy will.”

I think we should take a good look at the “Lebanese model.” After the end of the French colonial rule, the Lebanese “National Pact” split power according to sects, dividing the spheres of influence of Christians, Muslims (Shia and Sunni), Druze and other believers. I previously predicted that Iraq would learn from the “Lebanese model,” which is now just the way the regime of the Iraqi federation is organized. Most of Iraq’s population are Shia muslims, but there are also Sunni muslim in the west of the country, as well as the autonomous region of Kurds in the north, who account for 23% of the population. At present, Iraq has a Kurdish president and usually has a Shia prime minister, while other key government posts are held by Sunni.

I think Afghanistan can learn a lot from this, and that this would be the right way for them to go. The Taliban should create a balanced system with multi-ethnic and -factional participation according to the distribution of the Afghan population, which is dominated by Pashtuns, followed by Tajiks. The interests of the regime should be solidified by legal means to realize internal checks and balances so that the country would be relatively stable, which would also benefit the Taliban’s administration.

What interests does China have in Afghanistan? What is China expecting to happen with the political situation in Afghanistan?

Since Afghanistan is an important country on Chinas’ western border, the primary interest appeal of China is that Afghanistan will maintain its social stability, promote development to achieve prosperity, and avoid providing a hotbed for the “three forces” (the violent terrorist force, the ethnic separatist force and the religious extremist force). If the “three forces” would establish a relationship with separatist forces fighting for the independence of Xinjiang, they will pose great risks to China.

Regardless of who will be in power in Afghanistan, China hopes that it will no longer implement radical policies, such as providing training bases for terrorist organization the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Because of this, when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with the leader of the Afghan Taliban, he stressed that ETIM has been listed by the United Nations Security Council as an international terrorist organization, therefore China expects that the Afghan Taliban will dissociate itself from ETIM and other terrorist organizations and combat them instead. China expects that we will see a stable political situation in Afghanistan, rather than it becoming a base camp of chaos and terrorism.

The unstable situation in Afghanistan could also threaten China’s massive investment in Afghanistan, as well as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and other Chinese-funded projects in Pakistan. If Afghanistan can stabilize its political situation, China can further extend its Belt and Road to Afghanistan, construct a Central Asian Rail Network across Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and other parts of Central Asia, and connect it to the railway network in China, thereby saving the time in land transportation.

Meanwhile, China hopes that Afghanistan will pursue an independent foreign policy to reduce the opportunity for the U.S. to interfere in the political affairs of Central Asia. If Afghanistan can realize unity, it could become the third nonfounding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, following India and Pakistan.

The author is a professor at Zhejiang International Studies University and director of the Institute for Studies on the Mediterranean Rim.

The views and opinions expressed in this opinion section are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the editorial positions of Caixin Media.

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