Commentary: Will the War in Iran Derail the U.S.-China Summit?

1. At the 2024 World Economic Forum in Davos, Finnish President Alexander Stubb remarked on the unprecedented convergence of global crises—Venezuela, Ukraine, Greenland, Iran, and Gaza—that dominated discourse just in the first three weeks of the year. Unexpectedly, Iran itself soon became the epicenter of a major new crisis. Within slightly over a month from Davos, another Iran war began, triggered by U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, evoking comparisons to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq in terms of its scale and significance. The conflict started with the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, followed by Iranian retaliatory strikes against key U.S. allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and a near-total halt of shipping in the vital Strait of Hormuz, leading to Middle Eastern tensions unseen in decades. President Donald Trump framed the effort as a historic opportunity for regime change, akin to the transformation brought by Iran's own 1979 revolution[para. 1][para. 2][para. 3][para. 4].

2. The current Iran conflict, considered the largest geopolitical confrontation since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, is poised to reshape the Middle East’s balance of power and its geopolitical alignments, with impacts that extend globally. President Trump, now in his second term after defeating Kamala Harris in the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election and inaugurated on January 20, 2025, has paradoxically branded himself a “peace president,” touting the resolution of eight prior conflicts—even as U.S. military engagements, like the attack on Iranian nuclear sites and a 2026 operation in Venezuela, signal a trajectory contrary to this self-image. Trump’s foreign policy actions are partly explained by weak early-term constraints, the imperatives of “America First,” internal MAGA movement challenges, and impending midterm electoral pressures, which likely anticipated a loss of at least one congressional chamber by Republicans, thus motivating decisive, legacy-shaping foreign policy moves[para. 5][para. 6][para. 7][para. 8][para. 9][para. 10][para. 11][para. 12][para. 13][para. 14][para. 15][para. 16][para. 17][para. 18][para. 19][para. 20].

3. Trump’s administration has focused its foreign policy where U.S. influence is strongest: the Middle East. Since the Suez Crisis ended European dominance after World War II, America has been the main Western power in the region. Russia’s declining influence, exacerbated by its prolonged Ukraine conflict and compounded by Syria’s isolation, and China’s still-limited role as a regional actor leave the U.S. and Israel as the chief shapers of outcomes. The U.S. sees partnership with Israel—whose regional military superiority was cemented after the Gaza war—as essential. Secretary of State Marco Rubio defended the Iran operation by highlighting Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the need to partner with Israel to keep threats distant from U.S. homeland[para. 21][para. 22][para. 23][para. 24][para. 25][para. 26][para. 27][para. 28][para. 29][para. 30].

4. Iran continues to be a central Middle Eastern antagonist due to its large population, confrontational posture towards Israel, and operational reach via proxies. Efforts to contain its nuclear program have oscillated between diplomatic negotiations and direct military strikes. Internally, Iran is beset by recurring social unrest and an inability to capitalize on its vast oil reserves. This ongoing vulnerability makes regime stability a perennial risk, especially under external military pressure — a dynamic U.S. and Israel aim to exploit by destabilizing the regime’s apparatus and encouraging opposition. Despite Khamenei’s death, regime resilience persists, and both the U.S. and Israel have made clear their intention to avoid a protracted ground war, keeping the conflict limited to decapitation strikes and air operations[para. 31][para. 32][para. 33][para. 34][para. 35][para. 36][para. 37][para. 38][para. 39][para. 40][para. 41][para. 42][para. 43][para. 44][para. 45][para. 46][para. 47][para. 48][para. 49].

5. The trajectory of the current war is more expansive than in the “12-day war” of June 2025. Iran has broadened its retaliatory targets to all GCC countries, forcing them to experience direct consequences and thereby pressuring the U.S. and Israel to conclude the conflict quickly. However, these attacks risk uniting the Sunni Arab world against Shiite Iran and could permanently damage Iran’s covert ties with regional actors. Yet, even as Iran’s isolation grows, it still serves as a strategic counterbalance for Middle Eastern states wary of unchecked Israeli and U.S. power. The real regional impact will depend on how well the Iranian regime weathers the blows; its clerical foundation may weaken but is unlikely to vanish, nor is Iran likely to become pro-Western[para. 50][para. 51][para. 52][para. 53][para. 54][para. 55][para. 56][para. 57][para. 58][para. 59][para. 60][para. 61][para. 62][para. 63].

6. Meanwhile, the U.S.-China relationship faces a stress test as President Trump schedules a state visit to China amidst the war. China has vehemently opposed the U.S.-Israel strikes, citing violation of international norms. Still, both nations recognize the necessity of engagement to stabilize global supply chains and energy flows, especially through the Strait of Hormuz. Even if the planned summit is delayed, bilateral dialogue remains crucial. This latest U.S. action is a “spring surprise” complicating diplomatic predictability, but with both sides committed to de-escalation and practical cooperation, a measure of stability is still expected in 2025[para. 64][para. 65][para. 66][para. 67][para. 68][para. 69][para. 70][para. 71][para. 72][para. 73].