1. Robert Zoellick, former World Bank president, expects President Donald Trump to emerge from the November midterm elections with diminished political power but not with less noise. He argues that as Trump’s influence wanes, his instinct will be to find ever more dramatic ways to command attention. While congressional setbacks and the start of a succession contest could limit his ability to govern, they will give him ample reasons to dominate the news cycle. Zoellick believes the more Trump loses influence, the greater his inclination to take dramatic steps to stay the center of attention. For governments abroad, this distinction matters because a president dominating headlines may already be losing grip on the political process, and a world focused on his next move risks missing the larger question of how much of America’s international role can survive him. [para. 1][para. 2][para. 3][para. 4]
2. Zoellick’s career involved managing the integration of a rising China under US leadership. He notes that the problem today is that neither the US nor China is truly acting as a “responsible stakeholder” in the global system. He expects Democrats to regain the House, and possibly the Senate, which would bring investigations and accelerate the turn toward the next presidential election. A mid-October Fox News poll put Trump’s approval rating at 36%, down from 39% since May. Zoellick sees constraints beyond electoral math, including court rulings, voter backlash against policy overreach, and Senate Republicans withholding support without open confrontation. He warns that Trump will not respond by retreating. He uses an “Apprentice” analogy, suggesting Trump will play potential successors against each other while keeping control of the stage. Democrats face their own challenge, as progressive candidates who excite the base may struggle to win general elections, but he suspects they could take investigations further than the public wants. [para. 5][para. 6][para. 7][para. 8][para. 9][para. 10][para. 11]
3. Zoellick sees the next two years as a political transition, though the daily spectacle may suggest otherwise. This transition will matter globally, as even a new leader cannot completely repair relations—trust has been lost. Canada and Mexico have been deeply offended by American behavior, and a change of president would only offer an opportunity to repair, not automatically restore, those relationships. [para. 12][para. 13][para. 14][para. 15]
4. Regarding China, Zoellick does not expect Trump’s domestic frustrations to trigger dramatic escalation, as both presidents have reasons to keep the relationship stable. However, their September Washington meeting was “more form than substance,” offering little evidence of addressing deeper disagreements. Relations are in a stalemate, which is better than confrontation, but not what he hopes for. Implementation is a problem, as agreements at the presidential level do not translate into functioning channels lower down. He sees few senior officials on either side willing to take political risks to build trust. In Washington, the concern about competition has grown into a pervasive sense of China as a threat, making cooperation politically harder. [para. 16][para. 17][para. 18][para. 19][para. 20][para. 21]
5. Zoellick suggests looking for areas where the logic of rivalry is incomplete, such as artificial intelligence. Chinese companies are producing cheaper models, and Americans could draw on them for their own cheaper versions—they are feeding off one another rather than decoupling. This interdependence coincides with a shared interest in preventing AI from moving beyond human control, creating a reason for talks on safety. He is skeptical of using national security as a blanket objection to commercial openings, pointing to cheap Chinese solar panels and battery manufacturers producing in the US. Zoellick argues America’s strength gives it confidence to explore arrangements. He acknowledges this differs from the American mainstream, and that Chinese leaders interpret US policies as efforts to hold China down, drawing on historical anxieties. He sees a place for both Chinese preference for overarching frameworks and American problem-solving, noting that “success breeds success” in building trust. [para. 22][para. 23][para. 24][para. 25][para. 26][para. 27]
6. For Zoellick, the erosion of trust does not erase the foundations of international cooperation. NATO, Asian security arrangements, the IMF, World Bank, and WTO still exist. Japan, South Korea, and Europe still want US security guarantees and help. Trump’s transactional, narcissistic, and short-term approach has raised doubts about reliability, but if a future US leader treats people respectfully and shares benefits, transformation is possible. Some arrangements also serve Chinese interests—a credible US guarantee discourages South Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons; a weakening one could prompt Seoul to reconsider, with consequences for Japan. He also argues Beijing underestimates how seriously Europeans view the Russian threat and their perception of China as Moscow’s partner. [para. 28][para. 29][para. 30][para. 31]
7. Zoellick encourages other countries not to wait passively. He points to the trans-Pacific trade project (CPTPP) surviving after the US withdrew, showing adaptation is often easier than constructing new pacts. This supports debates on middle-power cooperation, though he cautions that on the largest questions, the weight of the US and China remains decisive. His next book on the world economy reflects this preference for adaptation, drawing an analogy to biology: an evolving, adaptive system rather than a clean break. [para. 32][para. 33][para. 34][para. 35][para. 36]
8. Asked about his biggest worry, Zoellick turns to debt accumulation, a problem governments repeatedly fail to resolve. The obstacle is the politics of addressing it. The Congressional Budget Office projects US federal debt held by the public rising from 101% of GDP in 2026 to 120% in 2036, with net interest outlays rising from 3.3% to 4.6% of GDP. France’s general government debt reached 3.6 trillion euros ($4 trillion), or 119% of GDP, at the end of Q2. Zoellick notes that while long-term rates are rising in the US, people still feel it could fix its debt if needed, whereas France’s political system raises doubts. This concern links back to whether political systems can adapt, as financial crises, pandemics, and wars demand the ability to raise money under uncertainty—ultimately, the ability to borrow in a crisis is the ultimate form of resilience. [para. 37][para. 38][para. 39][para. 40][para. 41]
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